In Lebanon’s Hands

Lebanon tends to be high on our August watchlist. This year there was no major single crisis, but five developments raised anxiety. Israel accused Hizballah of involvement in the Bourgas terrorist attack. A pro-Assad former Minister was arrested. Kidnappings returned in a dangerous 48 hours. Some Gulf countries told their nationals to leave. The Tripoli powder keg re-ignited. Throughout, the media were quick to accentuate the negative.

Lebanon has learnt to live with a certain level of instability. Periodically, for millennia, it has gone through phases of fragility, as regional tectonic plates and delicate demographics shift. The result is often conflict and political realignment. Are we in such a phase? Not yet. But I think there is an increasing realisation among Lebanese that Assad’s ability to directly influence political life in Lebanon is reducing. The system of Syrian patronage, reinforced over 30 years through brutality and corruption, is unravelling. This is a difficult but necessary phase. There is uncertainty, hedging, and recalculation.

The Lebanese are quick to blame outsiders for their woes. But what has changed over the last month is that there are clearer signs that both sides in the Syrian conflict are more willing to provoke or respond to violence within Lebanon, especially in Tripoli.  As ever, conspiracy theories abound.  To the optimist, there are positives: the Lebanese army has responded well; mainstream political leaders are trying to find consensus, including through President Sleiman’s national dialogue; business and life go on (a sign of both, I’ve just opened Mamas&Papas), and ‘what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger’. On the other side of the balance sheet, more arms are flowing in;  the state is struggling to deliver many services; the media anxious; borders porous; refugee numbers rising; sectarianism worse; the international community distracted by diplomatic jousting on Syria; and, perhaps, ‘what doesn’t kill you makes you more determined to kill your opponent first’.

Wherever I go in Lebanon, people ask ‘what next?’. I have to disappoint them by saying that we don’t know either. Lebanon will continue to feel tremors from Syria. But a more pronounced breakdown is not inevitable if the Lebanese people resolve to avoid it.

For Lebanon more than any other country in this troubled neighbourhood, the regional dynamic has the potential to make or break: we need to deliver  a stronger consensus that regional and international players  should avoid any action that undermines Lebanese stability. So I think UK actions should be guided by a simple principle: get the international community and Lebanese leaders to start treating Lebanon as an independent state with its own interests, rights and responsibilities, not eternally seen through the Syrian prism. Tricky, given the extent to which events in Syria are hitting Lebanon, but important.

More specifically, we must build up practical support to Lebanon to help manage contagion from Syria, including through increased training for the army, and increased funding for Syrian refugees. We’re working to support police reform, and preparations for elections in 2013. We have projects to help the state reassert itself, and to develop a more effective relationship with the Palestinian camps.

As Syria continues its transition, I hope therefore that we can focus in Lebanon on the opportunity to unshackle Lebanese talent. Like a nervous patient going to the doctor, we know that there could be some pain. But Lebanon will be stronger for a new and equal relationship with Syria and for a clearer commitment to Lebanese interests first.  Unsettling it may be to adjust to it, but the future is in Lebanon’s hands.