Ambassador to Austria and UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations and other International Organisations in Vienna
Part of UK in Ukraine
10th February 2012
EU integration and Ukraine: next steps?
What has to happen in order for Ukraine to start benefiting from the Association Agreement with the EU, and the associated Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), conclusion of negotiations on which were announced at the EU/Ukraine Summit on 19 December?
It is important to understand that the Association Agreement and the DCFTA will not take effect until several further steps have happened. Until then, these agreements cannot give Ukraine the foundations for long-term reform and economic growth for which they are designed. Some of the steps are technical; others are political. To take them in turn:
(i) initialling the agreement. This is a technical process which does not require a political decision. Together with lawyers, translators and other experts going through the agreed texts to make sure that there is no scope for uncertainty or difference about what has been agreed, this process is likely to take a number of months.
(ii) The next stage is signing. Before this can happen, a political decision of the European Council, representing the EU member states, is required. Because the Council decision would be on signature of the whole package (ie the Association Agreement including the DCFTA), it would be what is known in EU jargon as a “mixed agreement”. This means that the Council decision would need to be taken by unanimity: every single member state would have to agree.
(iii) Once the Association Agreement has been signed, it will need to be ratified by 30 Parliaments: those of the current 27 member states; Ukraine; the European Parliament; and soon-to-be-member state Croatia.
The technical detail of how signature and ratification work is important because the EU and member states have expressed concern that the recent trials of opposition leaders inUkraine appear to be politically motivated and selective. They have said explicitly, including during the EU-Ukraine Summit on 19 December, that unless opposition leaders jailed as the result of flawed trials are freed and permitted to participate in politics, it is unlikely that the Association Agreement will be signed or ratified – ie stages (ii) and (iii) above.
The mechanisms for signature and ratification mean that all the governments of the member states need to be satisfied before the Association Agreement can be signed; and all the parliaments of the member states, plus Croatia and the European Parliament, need to be satisfied before it can be ratified. It therefore seems unlikely that either of these stages will happen while opposition leaders remain in prison and unable to participate in politics on the basis of flawed trials.
Thus, these important agreements, potentially the most powerful tool to help bring about Ukraine’s European integration, will not begin to work.
PS: I have seen suggestions in some quarters that even if it is not possible to sign or ratify the Association Agreement and DCFTA, some elements of the Agreement could be put into force provisionally. In practice, this, too, looks unlikely. I will blog about this shortly.
Photo © DR
Does anybody know how to use the so-called Istanbul Agreement’ to import a car in to the Ukraine without paying porohibitive Customs Duties (taxes), as I have heard lots about this, but am unsure how effective a method it may be…
Sorry for inconvenience I could cause, but: can two politicians involved in conflict add more value for the common well-being both of EU and Ukraine than normal skilled worker? thousands of workers who can not get a visa and fulfill labour market properly for the reciprocal benefits of EU and Ukraine? Politicians choose among real possibilities. Workers create the lasts.
Kind regards.
Sounds like there are no technical problems exist in the signing of these agreements with the EU. The only one problem is a moral one. But is this really enough for permanent Ukraine’s opponents (and Russia supporters), like France and Germany? I’m not sure. And there is the second problem at least. There is no indication that residents of Ukraine would support EU Associate membership and the DCFTA because improving relations with Russia was one of the original platforms of Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential elections and he won the elections using this as his platform. Thus, he can use this ‘friendship with Russia’ rhetoric in order to get what he really wants, – to renegotiate the gas contract with Russia.
Dear Dmytro Antypov,
The Kremlin does not know the meaning of the word “friendship”. The word “friendship” is simply not included in the Kremlin’s dictionary.
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Similarly, this deal shows Moscow reverting to past practices of subsidizing neighbors and “special friends” to preserve their dependence upon Russia.
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18407&Itemid=132
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If “Azarov” wanted to “renegotiate”, then he would not have given Moscow the BSF – on a silver platter. Now, Moscow has an extended “beachhead” on Ukrainian land – for a song and a dance. Now, they can prosecute Tymoshenko for a “bad deal” – and ignore the fact that the BSF “good deal” was after the Tymoshenko “bad deal”?
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I posted many comments and questions at the link below, that I have never seen asked or answered. But, rather than post a comment much longer than your article, here is some:
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My analogy was to the question : “Is the lease a fair price?”.
How many square meters does the USA rent in the Transit Center at Manas ?
How many square meters does Moscow rent in Crimea ?
What is the comparison cost per square meter ?
How did the tenants treat their neighbors and landlord, and what did the tenants do to improve the landlords property ?
How long were the leases for, and what was the % increase ?
Read more:
http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/121484/#ixzz1mJr9G0u4
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One more thing:
And, “Azarov” signed a 5 year [+?] contract with the KGB to allow the Russian KGB to operate on Ukrainian land – AGAIN !
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After the BSF deal, I read an article that a “Russian security officer” that was driving from Crimea to Kyiv [Kharkiw?] and was stopped by a Ukrainian police officer and asked for his drivers license. The “Russian security officer” proceeded to bite off the ear of the Ukrainian police officer. I never saw any [arrest?] followup of that story. Gee? Can you imagine that a “Ukrainian” police officer had the audacity to ask for the ID of a “Russian security officer” – on Ukrainian land ?
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Sincerely,
LES
@LES, thanks for your comment! The word ‘friendship’, you will notice, is in quotation marks, so I’m not aiming to increase the Kremlin’s dictionary coverage. Anyway, here is my opinion regarding the BSF. This agreement enables the Ukrainian government to save up to $4bn per year, so it will cost for Russia near $40bn over the next 10 years in gas discounts. According to the Wikipedia article, under the new arrangement the United States will pay $200 millions for continued use of the facilities of the Transit Center at Manas: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transit_Center_at_Manas Comparing to the BSF deal it’s not a big money. Please take into account that ‘In March 2010 the US transported 50,000 NATO soldiers to Afghanistan via Kyrgyzstan’. So Kyrgyzstan was dragged into a war in Afghanistan for this money.